External Stability, Real Exchange Rate Adjustment and the Exchange Rate Regime in Emerging-Market Economies by Olivier Gervais et al.
 
Discussion Paper/Document d’analyse 
2011-5 
External Stability, Real Exchange Rate 
Adjustment and the Exchange Rate Regime 
in Emerging-Market Economies 
by Olivier Gervais, Lawrence Schembri and Lena Suchanek 
   2
Bank of Canada Discussion Paper 2011-5 
June 2011 
External Stability, Real Exchange Rate 
Adjustment and the Exchange Rate Regime 
in Emerging-Market Economies 
by 
Olivier Gervais, Lawrence Schembri and Lena Suchanek 
International Economic Analysis Department 
Bank of Canada 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G9 
Corresponding author: lsuchanek@bankofcanada.ca
Bank of Canada discussion papers are completed research studies on a wide variety of technical subjects  
relevant to central bank policy. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. 
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada. 
 
 ISSN  1914-0568  © 2011 Bank of Canada  
   ii
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Jeannine Bailliu, Charles Engel, Wei Dong, Michael Francis, 
Sharon Kozicki, René Lalonde, Robert Lavigne, and participants at the 2009 Canadian 
Economics Association meetings, in seminars at the Kiel Institute for the World 
Economy, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada and Carleton University for helpful 
comments, and Firas Abu-Sneneh and Amberly Jane Coates for excellent research 
assistance.   iii
Abstract 
In emerging-market economies, real exchange rate adjustment is critical for maintaining a 
sustainable current account position and thereby for helping to reduce macroeconomic 
and financial instability. The authors examine empirically two related hypotheses: (i) that 
real exchange rate flexibility and adjustment promotes external stability, and (ii) that a 
flexible nominal exchange rate facilitates real exchange rate adjustment. Based on an 
event-study analysis for a large set of emerging-market economies over the period 1975–
2008, the authors find that real exchange rate adjustment has contributed significantly to 
reducing current account imbalances. The adjustment of current account deficits in 
countries with a fixed exchange rate regime does not typically occur through the classical 
adjustment mechanism, but as a consequence of exchange rate crises, where the nominal 
exchange rate collapses and there are substantial costs in terms of forgone output. Vector-
error-correction results support the findings of the event study; namely, in the long run 
the real exchange rate movements facilitate current account adjustment. 
JEL classification: F31, F32, F41 
Bank classification: Exchange rate regimes; International topics; Development 
economics 
Résumé 
Dans les économies de marché émergentes, le taux de change réel doit pouvoir s’ajuster 
pour que le solde de la balance courante se maintienne à un niveau viable et pour aider à 
réduire l’instabilité macroéconomique et financière. Les auteurs examinent 
empiriquement deux hypothèses voisines : la première veut que la flexibilité et 
l’ajustement du taux de change réel favorisent la stabilité externe, et la seconde, qu’un 
taux de change nominal flexible facilite un tel ajustement. Sur la base d’une étude 
événementielle portant sur un vaste groupe d’économies émergentes et couvrant la 
période 1975-2008, les auteurs concluent que l’ajustement du taux de change réel a 
contribué de façon importante à atténuer les déséquilibres des balances courantes. Les 
déficits courants des pays dotés d’un régime de changes fixes ne se corrigent 
généralement pas par le jeu d’un ajustement classique, mais sous la pression d’une crise 
de change qui entraîne l’écroulement de ce régime et s’accompagne de pertes de 
production substantielles. Les résultats obtenus à partir d’un modèle vectoriel à correction 
d’erreurs corroborent les conclusions de l’étude événementielle, à savoir qu’à long terme, 
les mouvements du taux de change réel aident la balance courante à s’ajuster. 
Classification JEL : F31, F32, F41 
Classification de la Banque : Régimes de taux de change; Questions internationales; 
Économie du développement   1
1  Introduction 
Unsustainably large global current account (CA) imbalances are widely seen as an important 
contributing factor to the recent global financial crisis and economic recession, and the lack of 
exchange rate adjustment to these imbalances is viewed as being partly responsible.
1 The 
concern about global imbalances helped instigate the reform of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) surveillance activities that resulted in the 2007 Decision on Surveillance (IMF 2007). 
In this Decision, the IMF made the maintenance of “external stability” the focus of its 
surveillance activities over members’ exchange rate, fiscal, monetary and financial sector 
policies.
2 The IMF refers to “external stability” as a balance-of-payments position that does not, 
and is not likely to, give rise to disruptive exchange rate movements. The concept of external 
stability encompasses both the current and the capital account of the balance of payments, 
because CA imbalances may not cause disruptive exchange rate movements if they are 
complemented by sustainable capital inflows or outflows. In practice, however, the focus is 
primarily on CA imbalances and real exchange rate (RER) misalignment, because there is a well-
documented theoretical relationship between them.  
The purpose of this paper is to explore two related hypotheses: 
(i)  RER flexibility and adjustment promotes external stability (the main hypothesis), and  
(ii) a flexible nominal exchange rate facilitates RER adjustment, because nominal wages and 
prices are sticky (corollary hypothesis). 
Exploring these hypotheses is important, because they speak directly to exchange rate policy and 
the choice of exchange rate regimes. In particular, they address two key questions: first, does a 
relatively flexible RER enhance CA adjustment?
3 And second, if so, does a flexible exchange 
rate regime increase RER flexibility and thus promote smoother adjustment? Although the 
existing literature has tended to focus on the second hypothesis – the choice of nominal exchange 
rate regime – it is important to examine the first hypothesis: the critical role of the RER in the 
external adjustment process, especially for emerging-market economies (EMEs), since they are 
typically very open and dependent on trade.  
                                                 
1 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010) provide a recent survey of thought on the relationship between global imbalances and 
the financial crisis, arguing that they are related. Garcίa-Herrero and Koivu (2007) maintain that a more flexible 
nominal exchange rate would favour the adjustment of the trade balance.   
2 The fear of labelling member countries’ exchange rates as “misaligned” in Article IV reports has hampered the 
effective implementation of the 2007 Surveillance Decision. Lavigne and Schembri (2009) argue that the focus of 
IMF surveillance over exchange rates should, instead, be on permitting timely and effective real exchange rate 
adjustment, to ensure that CA imbalances are restored to sustainable levels.  
3 We measure external imbalances by the CA/GDP ratio. The literature has proposed alternative measures, such as 
the level of external debt to GDP, foreign assets or reserves in terms of import months. Adjustment capacity has 
been measured by the change in imports following a shock (Iqbal and Erbaş 1997) and the first-order 
autocorrelation of the CA (Cheung and Lai 2007; Chinn and Wei 2008).   2
Theories of external adjustment in open economies (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995) imply that 
adjustment to external imbalances can be most efficiently obtained via RER adjustment, rather 
than via income/output/expenditure adjustment. Relative price movements cause expenditure 
switching between domestic and foreign-produced goods, and can occur while the economy is 
operating at close to full employment.
4 In contrast, income and expenditure adjustment have 
proven to be much more costly in terms of forgone output and employment. In theory, market-
driven RER adjustment will occur in response to a CA imbalance either via money-supply and 
price-level movements under a fixed exchange rate (i.e., the classical adjustment process) or via 
movements in a flexible exchange rate (i.e., the Meade-Friedman adjustment process). Friedman 
(1953) argues that a flexible exchange rate facilitates RER adjustment, because of the stickiness 
and slow adjustment of domestic wages and prices. Numerous examples exist of the high cost of 
the classical adjustment process: the United Kingdom’s return to the gold standard in 1926, the 
West German boom of the 1960s, the Argentine experience with a currency board in the 1990s 
and the recent sovereign debt problems in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Successful examples of 
the classical adjustment process are rare. Countries with a fixed nominal exchange rate and CA 
surpluses typically frustrate the RER adjustment process by sterilizing the impact on the 
domestic money supply. In countries with a CA deficit, RER adjustment under a fixed exchange 
rate often occurs as a consequence of an exchange rate crisis in which the nominal rate collapses 
and economic activity is severely disrupted.
5 
To examine the two hypotheses of interest, we adopt two complementary empirical 
methodologies. We first consider the role of RER movements during episodes of sizable CA 
adjustments using an event study for 22 EMEs from 1975–2008, following the methodology of 
Freund and Warnock (2005).
6 We also separately analyze CA surplus reversals, and examine the 
implications of splitting the sample into crisis versus non-crisis episodes, and into fixed versus 
floating exchange rate regimes. The question of exchange rate regimes has not been addressed in 
the event-study literature and this approach yields useful results.  
Our empirical findings are consistent with the two hypotheses. First, we find that episodes of CA 
reversals from deficit to surplus have been associated with sizable RER depreciations. Moreover, 
the larger the CA reversal, the greater the depreciation. Second, there is a trade-off between the 
adjustment that comes via the RER and that through domestic income, demand and output. Put 
                                                 
4 In the presence of local currency pricing (LCP), the pass-through of currency depreciation to the current account 
may be limited. For some countries, there is substantial evidence for LCP, at least in the short run, because most 
exchange rate movements are perceived as being temporary. In the long run, however, permanent exchange rate 
movements must affect the prices importers face, and they will either pass on the increased cost to consumers or 
purchase from an alternative domestic or foreign supplier to mitigate the impact of the exchange rate movement on 
their costs and prices.  
5 Countries have, on occasion, tried to reduce exchange rate overvaluation by compressing domestic demand and 
creating unemployed resources, but this is a very costly way to achieve real exchange rate adjustment. 
6 A change in the real exchange rate is likely to affect the trade balance through expenditure switching. In our study, 
we focus on the current account, since we are more interested in its evolution and adjustment. However, the two 
variables are closely linked and tend to move together. See Freund (2005) for more details.    3
differently, if the RER cannot adjust quickly (because of a fixed nominal exchange rate or slow 
adjustment of relative price levels), output/income have to take on a larger burden of the 
adjustment. Third, the adjustment is more painful in terms of output loss for countries that had a 
fixed exchange rate regime at the time of the reversal, and the RER eventually depreciates by 
more. Our results suggest that faster adjustment of external imbalances occurs either via the 
movement of a more flexible nominal ER, or, more dramatically, as a result of an exchange rate 
crisis. Given that a crisis is more costly in terms of lost output, because of financial disruption, 
this finding implies that a flexible ER allows a more rapid and more orderly adjustment of the 
CA, which is consistent with our second hypothesis.   
We also examine the dynamic interaction of the CA, RER, and foreign and domestic income for 
the same sample of EMEs using a vector-error-correction model (VECM). To our knowledge, 
there have been no attempts in the literature to examine the long-run relationship between the 
CA and the RER for EMEs. We find that there exists a long-run cointegrating relationship 
between the CA and the RER, which is consistent with theory. The results, moreover, support 
our first hypothesis that, in the long run, the RER will adjust to reduce current account 
imbalances.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theory and provides a brief 
literature review. Section 3 describes the event study and the VECM analysis and results, and 
section 4 provides some concluding remarks. 
2  Theoretical Background and Related Empirical Results  
The theory surrounding adjustment to CA imbalances began most notably with the price-
specific-flow adjustment mechanism under the gold standard developed by David Hume in the 
18th century. Since then there have been many developments, including the work of Viner 
(1937), Meade (1951), Friedman (1953), Mundell (1962), Dornbusch (1980) and Branson 
(1983), leading up to the Redux model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). In all of these models, the 
RER moves to facilitate adjustment to a CA imbalance, regardless of whether the nominal 
exchange rate regime is fixed or flexible. For example, following a shock to external demand 
that creates a CA surplus, the RER will appreciate either through nominal exchange rate 
appreciation or through a rise in domestic inflation, thus reducing competitiveness and reducing 
exports, while favouring imports. Therefore, the main channel through which the RER helps 
bring about CA adjustment is through a relative price change that causes an “expenditure-
switching” effect.
7 The expenditure-switching mechanism retains its validity in the Obstfeld and 
                                                 
7 For some empirical evidence and evolution of the expenditure-switching effect, see Dong (2010).   4
Rogoff (1995) model provided that nominal prices are fixed in the producer country’s currency 
and exchange rate pass-through is complete.
8  
Friedman (1953) argues that a flexible exchange rate would adjust in response to external real 
shocks and thus help insulate the domestic economy in the presence of sticky wages and prices. 
Friedman notes that the speed at which relative prices would adjust depends crucially on the 
exchange rate regime. Since then, a number of theories have confirmed Friedman’s original 
intuition and it has become one of the strongest arguments in favour of flexible exchange rate 
regimes.
9  
In the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model, floating exchange rates are superior to fixed 
exchange rates when real shocks are the dominant source of disturbance to the economy 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). With a shock to the demand or supply of domestic output, the prices 
of domestic goods and factors must adjust. Because these prices are sticky, especially 
downwards, the economy gradually, and often at great cost, adjusts to its new long-run 
equilibrium. The opposite is true for a floating exchange rate regime: following a real shock, the 
adjustment to a new equilibrium is immediate, reached by a movement of the exchange rate, 
which eliminates the need for a change in the price level. Note that if money or asset demand 
shocks were to dominate, then they would be fully and automatically eliminated by foreign 
exchange rate intervention under a fixed exchange rate regime, thus leaving the real economy 
unaffected. In practice, however, real shocks are more significant. 
An empirical implication of these theories is that the adjustment of external imbalances across 
exchange rate regimes should differ. In particular, regimes that allow for faster movements in the 
RER should see a more rapid adjustment to external imbalances. Although theoretical models are 
based on RERs, there is limited evidence for our first hypothesis concerning the link between 
RER movements and the adjustment of real variables.
10 Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008) address 
the question of CA adjustment and the RER using a VECM. In particular, they focus on the 
diverging CAs of the individual euro area countries, the dynamics of CA adjustment and the role 
of the RER. They find that the RER has a substantial, but often non-linear, effect on CA 
adjustment.  
                                                 
8 The J-curve implies that there might be an initial deterioration of the CA following a real depreciation, because the 
Marshall-Lerner condition may not hold in the short run. A real depreciation initially causes imports to be more 
expensive and exports less expensive, and, if volumes are predetermined, will reduce the CA. Eventually, the 
volume of exports will rise because of the lower relative price, causing the demand for exports to pick up and 
domestic consumers to switch their expenditure to domestic products and away from expensive imported goods 
and services.  
9 See Dornbusch (1980) for descendants of the Mundell–Fleming model. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and 
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) for dynamic general-equilibrium models with nominal stickiness. 
10One exception is Lee and Chinn (2002). They use structural VARs to analyze the behaviour of the RER, the CA 
and other variables following temporary and permanent shocks. They find that temporary shocks play a larger role 
in explaining variations in the CA, whereas permanent shocks are more important for explaining RER variation.    5
Freund and Warnock (2005) use an event-study approach to examine episodes of CA adjustment 
in advanced countries. They first determine episodes of CA deficit reversals using the criteria in 
Freund (2005), and then examine the behaviour of key variables during the reversal. They find 
that CA adjustment tends to be associated with slow income growth and a real depreciation.  
With respect to the second hypothesis, the literature has considered the importance of exchange 
rate regimes for external adjustment and stability.
11 Chinn and Wei (2008) examine the 
importance of the nominal exchange rate regime for the adjustment process of the CA and find 
no robust relationship between the exchange rate regime and the rate of CA reversion.
12 In 
particular, they do not find a strong monotonic relationship between the flexibility of the 
exchange regime and the speed of convergence in RERs. However, these conclusions are 
somewhat misleading, because they assume that speedier adjustment is, in all cases, associated 
with less-costly adjustment. In practice, CA deficit adjustment under fixed exchange rate regimes 
does not occur via the classical adjustment process, but most often through exchange rate crises 
or forced devaluations, which are associated with large losses of employment and output. 
Moreover, their reduced-form regressions mask a large endogeneity problem and omit important 
control variables, including the degree of wage and price flexibility and the frequency and 
impact of exchange rate crises. 
Broda (2004) assesses the Friedman hypothesis that a flexible exchange rate will help insulate 
domestic output to external real shocks. He finds that countries with more flexible regimes in the 
face of negative shocks tend to have smaller output movements and more immediate and larger 
real appreciations/depreciations. In contrast, countries with fixed regimes experience large and 
significant declines in output, and the RER depreciates slowly by means of a fall in prices.
13 
Similarly, Hoffmann (2007) investigates responses of real GDP, the trade balance and the real 
exchange rate to world output and world real interest rate shocks. He also finds that external 
shocks are less contractionary under floating than under pegged exchange rates.  
In their study of small open economies in interwar Europe, Choudhri and Kochin (1980) contend 
that there were three different currency regimes: the “gold countries” (i.e., the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Italy and Poland); Scandinavian countries that were initially on the gold standard but 
then allowed their currency to adjust during the Great Depression; and Spain, which followed a 
floating exchange rate. Spanish output and prices remained largely unaffected compared with 
countries following the gold standard during the Great Depression. Deflation was more 
significant in Scandinavian countries than in Spain (floating rates), but smaller than in countries 
                                                 
11 A related literature has proposed methods for classifying exchange rate regimes. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2005), for instance, construct a de facto classification based on exchange rates and international reserves. 
Similarly, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) question the de jure IMF classification and develop a system of 
reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes, employing data on market-determined parallel exchange rates.  
12 The authors use the results of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) to determine the importance of the exchange rate 
regime for the adjustment process of the CA.  
13 A few authors (for instance, Helpman 1981) argue that the exchange rate regime does not matter.   6
under the gold standard (fixed rates). With regards to output, negative output effects were more 
severe in gold standard countries than in Scandinavia.   
3  Empirical Methodology  
To study the relationship between the CA and the RER, we first follow Freund and Warnock 
(2005) and use an event study to assess the behaviour of the RER in episodes of CA reversions. 
We then use a VECM to examine the role of RER flexibility in CA adjustment. 
3.1  Data and descriptive statistics 
For the empirical analysis, we use quarterly data on the RER, CA and a number of control 
variables (Tables 1a–c). The real effective exchange rate (RER) is measured using a trade-
weighted index of bilateral exchange rates, adjusted by relative consumer prices.
14 The RER is 
indexed to 100 in 2001Q4, and an increase in the RER corresponds to a real appreciation. The 
CA data have been seasonally adjusted and are expressed as a percentage of national GDP.
15 
Data limitations restrict the sample to 22 EMEs over the period 1975 to 2008 (Tables 1a–c). For 
comparison purposes, we include G-7 countries, for which a larger data sample is available.  
Consistent with our theoretical priors, CA reversals have generally been associated with large 
exchange rate movements. For instance, Argentina’s CA reversal from a deficit of about 3 per 
cent in 2001Q1 to a surplus of 10 per cent by the end of 2002 was accompanied by a RER 
depreciation of 60 per cent. Likewise, the deterioration of Mexico’s CA from a surplus of about 
1.5 per cent in 1987 to a deficit of 6 per cent in 1993 was accompanied by a RER appreciation of 
78 per cent. 
Table 2 shows the correlations between the CA, RER, output and the government balance across 
the three samples: EMEs, G-7 countries and total. In all samples, the correlation of the RER with 
the CA is negative, implying that an appreciation is generally associated with a decrease in the 
CA. This result is consistent with findings in the CA crisis literature.
16 The correlation is more 
pronounced for EMEs. The low correlation in G-7 countries likely reflects the impact of other 
variables. To check the robustness of our results, we include some control variables in our 
analysis that have been used to explain CA movements.  
Chart 1 plots the volatility of the CA versus the volatility of the RER. There seems to be a 
positive relationship between the flexibility of the RER and the variability of the CA, suggesting 
some evidence for our first hypothesis, that RER flexibility facilitates CA adjustment. To address 
the question of whether RER flexibility is associated with nominal exchange rate flexibility, we 
                                                 
14 For simplicity, RER refers to both the real exchange rate and the real effective exchange rate.  
15 If only annual data are available for a certain time period, we linearly interpolate missing quarterly data for the 
RER and the CA. 
16 See Algieri and Bracke (2007) for empirical evidence using an event study.    7
plot the volatility of both the real and the nominal exchange rates in Chart 2. Nominal exchange 
rate flexibility is associated with RER flexibility. However, the correlation between the two 
variables ranges from -0.58 in Turkey to 0.99 in Malaysia. A negative correlation between the 
nominal exchange rate and RER movements implies that nominal exchange rate movements are 
not closely reflecting the differences in inflation rates, as the relative purchasing-power parity 
would suggest.  
3.2  Event-study approach 
To examine the validity of these hypotheses empirically, we first apply Freund and Warnock’s 
(2005) event study to our broader set of EMEs. This kind of analysis is not new; for instance, 
Algieri and Bracke (2007) apply Freund and Warnock’s methodology to a larger set of countries, 
including some EMEs. We extend this exercise to a larger set of emerging-market countries to 
yield new insights about the role of RER adjustment for CA adjustments for different groups of 
EMEs. An important contribution of our analysis is that we distinguish between crisis and non-
crisis episodes, and between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes at the time of the reversal. 
We also analyze CA surplus reversals. We then evaluate the behaviour of output growth and 
RER movements, the two main contributors to CA adjustment according to the existing 
literature. In a first step, we determine CA reversal episodes for our sample. Following Freund 
and Warnock (2005), the criteria for a CA reversal are: 
(i)  The CA deficit (surplus)-GDP ratio exceeds 2 per cent before the reversal. 
(ii)  The average deficit (surplus)-GDP ratio is reduced by at least two percentage points 
over three years (from the minimum to the centred 3-year average). 
(iii)  The CA deficit (surplus)-GDP ratio is reduced by at least one-third. 
(iv)  The maximum deficit (surplus)-GDP ratio in the five years after the reversal is not 
larger than the minimum in the three years before the reversal. 
The first three criteria ensure that only large CA reversals are captured, whereas the fourth 
indicates that the reversal was sustained.  
3.2.1  CA deficit reversals 
Using these criteria on data for our set of EMEs from 1975–2008, we identify 55 episodes of CA 
deficit adjustment in 22 countries (Table 3).
17 Chart 3 documents the pattern of adjustment 
across the CA, the RER and GDP growth, with event time 0 corresponding to the year in which 
the CA balance is most negative.
18 On average, the CA deficit stood at -6.5 per cent of GDP at 
the time of reversal (at -3.9 per cent for G-7 countries, see Chart 4). In our sample, there is 
                                                 
17 For comparison, episodes for G-7 countries are reported in Table 5. 
18 In theory, domestic demand should be used, instead of GDP, to explain import demand and the CA. Where 
available, we use domestic demand and find that the results are similar to those obtained using GDP (i.e., domestic 
demand increases during CA surplus reversals and decreases during CA deficit reversals). Thus, GDP is used to 
get a larger sample of countries.    8
considerable variation across episodes, ranging from relatively small deficits of 2 per cent in 
Argentina in 1980 to over 13 per cent in Ecuador in 1998. During these episodes, the CA 
improved by an average of 6 percentage points within the three years following the start of the 
reversal.  
In the majority of cases, patterns of output growth and the RER movements are consistent with 
theory and other findings in the literature: in 70 per cent of the cases, the RER depreciated in the 
three years following the start of the CA deficit reversal. On average (for all identified episodes), 
the RER depreciated by about 9 per cent. However, in all 55 cases, countries experienced a total 
depreciation of, on average, 33 per cent.
19 These results provide ample proof that CA deficit 
reversals in EMEs have been accompanied by sizable real exchange rate depreciation. This result 
is consistent with findings in the literature, although the adjustment of the RER for EMEs seems 
to be more pronounced. Freund (2005), for instance, finds that, in industrialized countries, CA 
deficit reversals are accompanied by a real depreciation of about 10 to 20 per cent. Moreover, in 
our sample there seems to be a positive correlation between the size of the CA deficit reversal 
(within the first three years) and the size of the total depreciation over that period (Chart 5).  
Further, in 70 per cent of episodes, CA deficit reversals have been accompanied by a decrease in 
real GDP growth, by an average of 1.6 percentage points.
20 This decrease seems to be in line 
with previous findings (Algieri and Bracke 2007), and is consistent with theoretical priors.  
We examine whether there is evidence of a trade-off between adjustment through GDP 
contraction or through RER depreciation. Freund and Warnock (2005) argue that limited 
exchange rate adjustment leads to weaker output/income growth during CA deficit reversal. 
Indeed, we also find an inverse correlation between the extent of exchange rate adjustment and 
the slowdown in GDP growth (Chart 6). The evidence indicates a clear trade-off between CA 
adjustment that comes through either RER depreciation or weaker GDP growth. If exchange rate 
movements are limited, the CA position worsens further and the GDP reduction is more 
significant. Thus, RER flexibility is critical to low-cost (in terms of lost output) CA adjustment.  
Significant current account deficit reversals are often the outcome of currency crises. Most of the 
countries in our sample have experienced currency crises. These crises may magnify the 
correlation between the CA and the RER.
21 We therefore split the sample into crisis (17) and 
non-crisis (24) episodes (Chart 7).
22 Not surprisingly, during crisis episodes, the CA reverts 
                                                 
19 Total depreciation is defined as the percentage change between the maximum value of the RER in the three years 
leading up to the reversal minus the minimum value of the RER in the three years following the reversal. 
20 This is not the case for G-7 countries. 
21 The episodes determined in Tables 2 and 3 include crisis episodes as well as episodes of “normal” reversion of 
CA imbalances. 
22 We rely on several studies to determine crisis episodes for all countries in our sample: Frankel and Cavallo 
(2004); Kaminsky (2003); Calvo and Reinhart (2000); Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004). Crisis episodes 
determined in different papers for the same country overlap significantly.   9
faster and by more (7.9 percentage points within three years), and is accompanied by a much 
stronger currency depreciation (15 per cent in three years, and 34 per cent over the period as a 
whole). Also, GDP growth contracts substantially more during crisis episodes (2.54 percentage 
points).  
To yield insight on our second hypothesis, we split the sample of CA deficit reversals into fixed 
and flexible exchange rate regimes at the time of the reversal. To identify regimes, we use the 
classification compiled by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) for the specific countries at the 
time of the CA reversal. For robustness, we also use the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
classification. Chart 8 shows the classification of countries used in this study from 1974–2000.
23 
Some interesting results emerge (Chart 9): first, CA reversals occur earlier in countries with 
fixed ER regimes, at a CA-deficit-to-GDP ratio of 5.2 per cent compared with 6.5 per cent for 
floating ER regimes. Despite the deeper trough, the adjustment of the CA in floating ER regimes 
occurs sooner, suggesting that flexible ER regimes allow for faster resolution of external 
imbalances.
24 Second, on average, a significant RER depreciation precedes a CA deficit reversal 
in fixed exchange rate regimes, with sizable RER depreciations during the reversal. This 
observation suggests that, despite the fixed nominal rate, adjustment has to come through the 
RER – in most cases through a crisis and the collapse of the fixed ER regime. In this case, the 
adjustment through the RER is larger than for a flexible regime. And, most importantly, the cost 
in terms of GDP growth is significantly greater in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes: 
GDP growth drops from an average of 8.2 per cent two quarters before the reversal to -0.2 per 
cent a year after the reversal, compared with a drop from 5.8 per cent to 0.7 per cent in floating 
regimes. This finding implies that adjustment of external imbalances is more painful if there is 
limited nominal ER flexibility. The results support our second hypothesis that more flexible ER 
regimes facilitate the maintenance of external stability through a rapid and less costly adjustment 
of external imbalances. Moreover, countries with fixed exchange rate regimes typically 
experience CA deficit adjustment through large depreciation and substantial losses in GDP 
growth. 
Using the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification, the results differ somewhat, but the basic 
conclusions still hold. The CA takes much longer to revert in countries with fixed regimes, 
suggesting that flexible rates facilitate a more rapid adjustment. The RER depreciates more, by 
around 10 per cent within six quarters in flexible regimes, whereas the RER remains flat during 
the reversal for fixed regimes.  
                                                 
23 These classifications are better able to capture de facto ER regimes compared with de jure regime classification 
such as in the IMF’s official ER classification, published annually in its Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. For a discussion of de facto and de jure exchange rate regime 
classification, see Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault (2003). 
24 After three quarters, 2/3 of the deficit is resolved when the country is under a flexible exchange rate regime. On 
the other hand, only 1/3 of the deficit is reverted after three quarters when the country is under a fixed regime.     10
3.2.2  CA surplus reversals 
Using the same criteria as described above, we identify 30 CA surplus reversal episodes (Table 
4).
25 The results are broadly symmetric to the analysis of CA deficit reversals. On average, the 
surplus at the start of the reversal was 7.8 per cent of GDP (4.1 per cent in the G-7 countries, see 
Chart 4) and it fell by 8.9 percentage points within three years (Chart 3). Again, there is 
considerable variation across episodes, ranging from relatively small surpluses, of 2 per cent in 
Bolivia in 1990Q4, to 20 per cent in Russia in 2002Q2. 
Within three years of the peak, the RER appreciated in 80 per cent of the cases. The average 
appreciation (including all episodes) was large (20 per cent, on average). Note that the 
appreciation is smaller for G-7 countries. Again, these results provide ample evidence for our 
first hypothesis (that CA adjustments are facilitated by RER movements), and evidence that RER 
movements can be large. Consistent with theory, GDP growth increased during 80 per cent of 
these episodes by an average of 1.7 percentage points. 
We can again split our sample into countries that had a fixed or a flexible exchange rate regime 
at the time of the reversal (Chart 10).
26 On average, CA surpluses start to revert earlier in flexible 
regimes (at 7 per cent of GDP, compared with 9 per cent for fixed regimes). The major 
contributing factor to CA surplus reversion in fixed ER regime countries is rapid output growth, 
suggesting that nominal ER rigidity impedes adjustment through RER appreciation. As for 
countries with a flexible exchange rate regime, both RER appreciation and GDP growth 
contribute to the adjustment process. The results again provide evidence consistent with our 
second hypothesis: the RER does not adjust rapidly in fixed ER regimes; more of the adjustment 
comes through GDP growth.
27 
The event study has provided some insight into the characteristics of CA deficit and surplus 
reversals. Generally, CA adjustment is accompanied by significant RER movements and 
adjustment is less costly, in terms of lost output, under a flexible ER regime. However, a 
deficiency of the event-study approach is that it does not fully capture the empirical relationship 
between these variables over time, but only over discrete episodes. In the next section, we 
examine the time-series relationship between these variables to complement the event-study 
analysis. 
                                                 
25 For comparison, episodes in G-7 countries are reported in Table 6. 
26 The sample size for this exercise is very small (4 fixed ER regimes and 10 floating ER regimes); the results should 
therefore be interpreted with caution. 
27 These main findings are robust to using the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) ER regime classification (not shown). The 
CA reverts later and slower under a fixed ER regime. More of the adjustment occurs through RER appreciation 
under a floating ER regime.   11
3.3  VECM approach 
To analyze the long-run relationship between the CA and the RER, we use a VECM approach. 
Since the data for these two series indicate that they are integrated of order one over the sample, 
the VECM allows the estimation of a cointegrating relationship without imposing a causal 
relationship between two endogenous variables. The main advantage of a VECM specification in 
the context of our research is that it allows us to empirically estimate the long-run relationship 
between the CA and the RER, as well as to determine the CA’s reversion speed.
28 A second 
advantage of the VECM is that it allows feedback effects between the variables.
29 
3.3.1  Integration and cointegration 
Unit root tests reject the hypothesis that the series are stationary, thereby implying that the 
variables are, in general, I(1).
30 The presence of unit roots in these two series leads us to test 
whether they are cointegrated. In 11 out of 22 cases we reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration at the 95 per cent confidence level, and 16 out of 22 at the 90 per cent confidence 
level (see Table 7). In this section, we focus on these 16 countries; in section 3.3.4 we test for 
cointegration in the remaining six countries by adding income differential variables to the 
cointegrating vector.  
The finding that the CA and the RER are not cointegrated for a number of countries can be 
explained by several factors, beyond the fact that the test may have low statistical power on a 
relatively short sample. First, for some countries, this might be due to the omitted variable 
problem, which we address in section 3.3.4. Second, the CA and the RER might not adjust as 
expected in theory, because policies may impede the adjustment of either variable. For instance, 
in countries with fixed exchange regimes and sticky and/or regulated prices, the RER is likely to 
be inflexible, and therefore would adjust very slowly, if at all, to its long-run equilibrium value. 
Policy intervention is the likely explanation of the finding of no cointegration between China’s 
CA and RER. Similarly, we find no strong evidence of cointegration for Malaysia, India and 
Thailand, countries that are known to intervene in their foreign exchange markets or use capital 
controls. Sterilization policies under a fixed exchange regime also hinder CA adjustment, since 
these policies do forestall adjustment of relative prices.
31   
                                                 
28 An alternative measure of the adjustment speed of the CA could be the size of the autoregressive coefficient (e.g., 
Chinn and Wei 2008). However, the autoregressive coefficient on the CA may be influenced by the number of 
different shocks that a country experiences, and therefore a test based on this coefficient fails to distinguish 
between alternative hypotheses. For example, an estimated low value of the autoregressive coefficient may 
indicate rapid adjustment due to flexible policies, or low CA persistence due to the absence of shocks. 
29 A reduced-form regression would estimate the effect of a depreciation of the exchange rate on the CA, given by 
the partial derivative. The VECM captures feedback effects, represented by the total derivative. 
30 CA is I(1) in 17 out of 22 cases (exceptions: Ecuador, India, Israel, South Korea and Poland). The RER is I(1) in 
20 out of 22 cases (exceptions: Argentina and Israel). Panel unit root tests suggest that the CA is stationary, 
whereas there is some evidence for a unit root in the case of the RER. 
31 See Lavigne (2008) for more details on sterilization activities.   12
3.3.2  Specifying a VECM 
We next specify a VECM between the CA and the RER that restricts the long-run behaviour of 
these two endogenous variables to converge to their cointegrating relationship while allowing for 
short-run adjustment dynamics. Given that the data are quarterly, the VECM is specified with 
lags of each variable as follows:
32 
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where β represents the long-run equilibrium relationship between the CA and the RER, and αCA 
and αRER measure the speed of adjustment of the CA and the RER, respectively. In the long run, 
the CA should return to the level consistent with the level of the RER:  
t t RER CA β = . 
We estimate a two-equation VECM to allow for the joint endogeneity of the RER and the CA.
33 
Theory predicts that β should be negative. Table 8 reports the estimated cointegrating vectors for 
the countries in the sample, normalized on CAt. The persistence of the short-term variations in 
the CA depends on the value of αCA; for instance, a value of αCA near 0 will lead to very persistent 
adjustment dynamics.  
3.3.3  Results 
We first examine the long-run relationship between the CA and the RER. The estimated value of 
β has the expected negative sign for 14 out of 16 countries (Table 7). Thus, the result is 
consistent with the hypothesis of a negative long-term relation between the CA and the RER, and 
supports our hypothesis that RER movements are associated with CA adjustment. The result is 
also consistent with findings by Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008), although these authors 
consider only European countries. This finding holds despite our sample including episodes of 
crisis. Hence, the estimated negative coefficient captures the adjustment of a CA deficit via RER 
depreciation, regardless of whether it is as a result of a currency crisis or through smoother RER 
adjustment. There is, however, a wide dispersion in the size of the estimated β coefficient: it 
ranges from 0.06 for Brazil to 0.91 for Russia. 
Turning next to the results for the short-run dynamics of our estimated equations (1) and (2), 
deviations from the cointegrating relationship can be corrected through the adjustment of the CA, 
or the adjustment of the RER. The speed of adjustment of the CA, αCA, is negative and 
statistically significant for all countries, indicating that the CA responds significantly to past 
                                                 
32 The estimated empirical model uses seasonally adjusted current account data. The estimation was also done using 
season dummies with raw current account data, and the results are not statistically different.  
33 Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008) use a similar VECM method to assess real exchange rate and CA dynamics.    13
deviations (Table 8).
34 The speed of adjustment in the RER equation, αRER, is not statistically 
significant for most of the countries, meaning that there is little evidence for an adjustment of the 
RER toward its long-term equilibrium value.
35  
The adjustment speed αCA also varies considerably across countries (Chart 11), ranging from 0.02 
in Russia to 0.295 in South Korea. An α of 0.136 for Argentina, for instance, suggests that     
13.6 per cent of the difference between the equilibrium and observed CA is eliminated within 
one quarter. This corresponds to a half life of the CA of 4.74 quarters, or one year and two 
months. The average adjustment speed of 0.134 is comparable to the results of Arghyrou and 
Chortareas (2008), who find an average CA adjustment speed of 0.18 for 11 European countries. 
The interpretation of the size of αCA is not straightforward. Ignoring crisis episodes, a higher 
adjustment speed would imply that a country adjusts rapidly to external imbalances. However, 
the adjustment of external imbalances can, in many cases, occur as a result of exchange rate 
crises. Therefore, the result that the CA adjusts rapidly might be driven by the fact that these 
countries experienced currency crises with rapid movements in the RER and the CA (such as in 
the case of South Korea). For other countries, the adjustment speed of the CA is quite low. This 
observation could have several possible explanations. First, some countries have limited nominal 
exchange rate flexibility, which will reduce real exchange rate adjustment and thus CA 
adjustment. For these countries, adjustment has to come through increased trade competitiveness 
by reducing relative unit labour costs and prices. If prices are sticky in the short run, convergence 
of the CA has to come through other variables than the RER, such as output/income levels. 
Consequently, countries with inflexible nominal exchange rates may face significant and 
persistent CA imbalances in the event of demand shocks. Second, we may attribute slow 
reversion of the CA to the fact that the CA likely adjusts through other variables that are not 
incorporated in our model. 
3.3.4  Accounting for income growth differentials
36 
Theoretically, income growth differentials across countries should play an important role in the 
determination of the CA. Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008) estimate the cointegrating relationship 
between the CA, the RER and income growth differences. Here, we examine whether adding 
income differentials to the cointegrating vector can help explain the relationship between the CA 
and the RER for the six countries for which little evidence of a cointegrating relationship 
between the CA and the RER was found.  
                                                 
34 The fact that the coefficient is statistically significant also implies that the RER Granger causes the CA in the long 
run, supporting our first hypothesis. 
35 The coefficient αC  has the expected sign and is significant for 5 out of 16 countries. This implies that, for most 
countries, it is the CA that adjusts to the long-run equilibrium, whereas the RER is the trend variable. 
36 The literature has suggested a list of variables that could be cointegrated with the RER. We test for the budget 
balance (Afonso and Rault 2008) and terms of trade, and account for episodes of crises using dummy variables. 
The test results are not reproduced, to save space, but are available from the authors.    14
Following Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008), we use G-7 national income as a proxy for foreign 
income. Although G-7 national income might be a better indicator of foreign demand for some 
countries than for others, we feel that it is a useful proxy because G-7 income represents about 
52 per cent of world income. The cointegration test shows that we reject the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration between growth, GDP growth* (foreign demand; i.e., G-7 income), the CA and 
the RER in five out of the six countries (the exception being Turkey) (Table 9). This finding 
suggests that the level of income growth is an important determinant of CA reversion in these 
countries. Given our theoretical priors, we impose one cointegrating vector in the VECM.
37 
Table 10 reports the results for the estimated cointegrating vectors. The absolute values of the 
coefficients of GDP and GDP* are lower than those of the RER, with the exception of China, 
which is the opposite of that found by Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008). This finding suggests 
that, for the EMEs under consideration, RERs have been playing a more prominent role than 
relative incomes in long-run CA adjustment, whereas for European countries, relative incomes 
seem to have had a bigger impact on CA adjustment. This result is generally consistent with the 
findings in the event-study analysis: real exchange rates have to depreciate by more in EMEs 
than in industrialized countries in order to facilitate CA adjustment.  
4  Conclusion 
In this paper, we explore two related hypotheses: (i) that RER flexibility and adjustment is 
critical to maintaining external stability defined as a sustainable current account position (main 
hypothesis), and (ii) that a flexible nominal exchange rate facilitates RER adjustment and the 
maintenance of external stability (corollary hypothesis).  
We adopt two complementary empirical methodologies. Using an event-study analysis for a 
large set of EMEs over the 1975–2008 period, we find evidence in favour of our first hypothesis: 
RER adjustment helps reduce CA imbalances and maintain external stability. CA reversions are 
typically accompanied by large RER movements, regardless of the exchange rate regime. 
However, the crucial distinction becomes how countries adjust to large CA deficits: the 
adjustment may come through an “orderly process” of gradual RER depreciation, or through a 
currency crisis and exchange rate collapse. Second, we find some evidence consistent with our 
second hypothesis that a flexible nominal ER facilitates RER adjustment and the maintenance of 
external stability. We find that (i) the adjustment is more painful in terms of output loss for 
countries that had a fixed exchange rate regime at the time of the reversal, especially if a 
currency crisis also occurs, (ii) the RER depreciates and output falls by more in crisis episodes 
                                                 
37 The log of GDP is stationary. However, Hansen and Juselius (1995) have noted that not all individual variables 
included in the CI regression need be I(1). To find cointegration between non-stationary variables, only two of the 
variables have to be I(1). The variables should be chosen for their economic relevance, and not merely for their 
time-series properties.   15
(with fixed or intermediate ER regimes), and (iii) the CA reverts faster in countries with a 
flexible exchange rate regime and in countries that adjust through a currency crisis.  
Our vector-error-correction modelling confirms that the negative relationship between the RER 
and the CA holds in the long run. The result is consistent with our first hypothesis, that CA 
adjustment is correlated with RER movements, regardless of the ER regime. Moreover, 
deviations from the long-run relationships are important determinants of CA reversion. 
In sum, our findings support recent arguments that EMEs should permit their RERs to adjust to 
external imbalances by eschewing efforts to sterilize the impact of these imbalances on the 
domestic money supply and on domestic prices and wages. EMEs should also allow more 
nominal exchange rate flexibility in order to promote adjustment to external imbalances, thus 
avoiding crises and large costs in terms of lost output. 
Going forward, it would be interesting to separately identify the contribution of nominal 
exchange rate and price adjustment to RER flexibility, and thus CA reversion. Further research 
could test for structural breaks in the estimated cointegration relationships to account for the fact 
that estimated coefficients change pre- and post-crisis, or before and after a country changes its 

















                                                 
38 Fujii (2002) studies a related question on purchasing-power parity and argues that long-run parameters in the 
cointegration relation do not change, but that the adjustment speed of some Asian countries changed after the 
Asian crisis.   16
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Table 1c: Data Sources and Frequency for GDP 
Country  Time frame  Frequency Notes 
Argentina   1970‐2008  Quarterly  Annual from 1981‐1990 
Bolivia   1970‐2008  Annual 
Brazil   1970‐2008  Quarterly  Annual from 1970‐1990 





Hungary   1970‐2008  Quarterly  Annual from 1970‐1995 
Indonesia   1970‐2008  Quarterly  Annual from 1970‐1993 
India   1970‐2008  Quarterly  Annual from 1970‐2000, data from IIF 
Israel   1970‐2008  Quarterly 
South Korea   1970‐2008  Quarterly 
Malaysia   1970‐2008  Quarterly  Annual from 1970‐1988 
Mexico   1970‐2008  Quarterly  Annual from 1970‐1980 
Peru   1970‐2008  Annual 
Philippines   1982‐2008  Annual 
Poland   1981‐2008  Quarterly  Annual from 1981‐1995 
Russia   1996‐2008  Quarterly 
Thailand   1970‐2008  Quarterly  Annual from 1970‐1983 








Table 2: Correlations between Main Variables (1970–2008) 
Correlations in levels  Correlations in first differences 
CA  RER  GDP growth  CA   RER  GDP growth 
All countries  -0.103  0.022  All countries  -0.014  0.051 
G-7 -0.019  -0.018  G-7 0.054  -0.033 
EMEs  -0.097  0.052  EMEs  -0.019  0.115 
Note: CA stands for the current account and RER for the real effective exchange rate.    21
Table 3: List of CA Deficit Adjustment Episodes in EMEs and Main Characteristics 
Country  Date 
started 
CA deficit at 
beginning 
Change in CA 
(3 Years) 
Change in RER 
from t0 to t3 
Change in ER 





1980Q4 -2.05  2.51  -66.34  -66.34  -3.79 
1998Q1 -5.16  1.95  8.7  -16.02  -3.84 
Bolivia 
1981Q4 -7.92  5.75  99.65  -69.47  -3.99 
1987Q4 -9.29  11.34  -20.27  -88.51  4.6 
1998Q2 -9.81  5.81  0.77  -15.04  -1.95 
Brazil 
1982Q4 -5.77  5.57  -35  -35  -0.5 
2001Q1 -4.71  6.03  -16.72  -57.05  0.45 
Chile 
1984Q2 -7.9  3.26  -38.9  -56.07  7 
1997Q4 -7.91  5.2  -11.53  -14.2  -5.24 
China 1985Q4  -4.1  2.87  -14.42  -53.39  -1.47 
Colombia 
1983Q1 -7.85  4.44  -35.22  -37.13  4.33 
1997Q4 -5.45  6.52  -17.09  -27.93  -5.22 
Czech Rep. 
1997Q1 -8.19  3.93  4.62  -22.6  -8.98 
2003Q4 -7.89  4.46  14.35  -24.04  2.53 
Ecuador 
1980Q4 -5.43  4.51  2.46  -19.37  -3.99 
1987Q4  -10.68 7.19  0.3  -57.38 0.13 
1998Q3  -13.89 11.7  -6.44 -50.34 -2.64 
2001Q2 -4.25  2.91  15.33  -54.17  4.81 
Hungary 
1978Q4  -7.55 4.37 -9.18 -3.31 -3.31 
1987Q1 -5.56  1.97  -0.71  -22.73  1.83 
1994Q3 -10.5  6.62  4.75  -14.59  6.73 
Indonesia 
1983Q4 -8.36  4.19  -22.25  -25.39  -1.17 
1995Q4 -2.68  6.46  -34.91  -64.43  -6.59 
2004Q1 -3.21  5.56  13.81  -38.14  0.87 
India 
1990Q4 -3.02  2.6  -8  -12.09  -2.34 
1998Q1 -2.79  2.54  0.89  -11.09  -1.18 
Israel 
1985Q1 -5.41  5.47  -2.08  -18.66  3.27 
1994Q2 -7.69  4.06  10.19  -11.91  -0.2 
2000Q4 -3.31  4.8  -17.95  -20.79  -4.13 
South Korea 
1980Q1 -10.99  5.5  -1.82  -4.6  -4.6 
1991Q1  -3.67 2.87 -5.23 -19.2 -1.67 
1997Q1 -5.2  7.07  -12.36  -39.96  -5.01 
Malaysia 
1982Q4  -13.24  11.22 -4.09 -17.3 -2.22 
1995Q4 -9.56  23.42  -20.63  -27.81  -5.79 
Mexico 
1981Q4 -6.44  8.85  -27.93  -38.15  -8.4 
1994Q4 -7.06  5.15  -4.6  -47.55  -1.06 
2001Q1  -3.13  2.45  -8.15 -29.48 -4.21 
Peru 
1981Q4 -6.69  7.07  2.34  -26.66  -6.42 
1995Q4  -8.84  5.4  -1.49 -16.05 -2.41 
1997Q3  -6.29  4.93  -7.74 -12.99 -5.49 
Philippines 
1982Q4 -8.64  8.49  -15.02  -29.15  -7.82 
1997Q4 -6.13  2.2  -17.73  -32.76  -2.6 
 
           (continued) 
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Table 3 (concluded) 
Poland 
1978Q4  -10.84 4.85 -15.66  -38.28 0.05 
1993Q4  -4.7  2.58  22.76 -47.73 10.94 
1999Q4 -7.38  4.79  15.33  -27.55  -2.21 
Russia 1998Q1  -4.56  20.25  -26.43  -44.89  4.9 
Thailand 
1983Q2 -4.99  3.3  -16.14  -17  0.76 
1995Q3 -10.06  20.85  -12.72  -34.74  -0.45 
2005Q2  -8.34 12.45 19.34 -18.3 -4.17 
Turkey 
1980Q4 -6.03  2.25  -10.83  -11.62  2.45 
1986Q1 -2.06  3.56  -15.95  -25.78  -0.17 
1993Q4 -3.26  2.25  10.4  -27.5  -9.48 
S. Africa 
1976Q1 -8.72  15.15  17.27  -19.91  -2.16 
1982Q1 -9.53  11.52  -19.82  -27.93  -4.23 
1997Q1 -2.34  1.59  -11.21  -24.27  -1.68 
Average
39   -6.67(-6.42) 6.26  (6.09) -6.35(-8.82) -31.17(-32.64) -1.58(-1.36) 
Crisis   -6.62  7.9  -15.24 -34.27  -2.54 
Non-crisis   -6.74  5.44  1.32  -28.15  -0.86 
 
                                                 
39 The numbers in brackets correspond to the sample used in the graphs in Chart 8, which excludes any period for 
which the data for all three variables in the period t-3 to t+3 were incomplete.   23
Table 4: List of CA Surplus Adjustment Episodes in EMEs and Main Characteristics 
Country Date    Identified 
CA 
Deterioration 














1989Q4 6.56  -8.38  143.11  143.11  3.68 
2002Q3 11.25  -7.04  14.99  169.66  11.33 
Bolivia 1990Q4  2.05  -9.12  5.34  28.61  0.51 
Brazil 2004Q2 2.06  -1.3  54.56  89.17  2.52 
China 
1991Q1 3.29  -4.4  -23.38  108.7  3.96 
1997Q4 3.91  -2.19  -1.23  33.02  -2.7 
Colombia 1991Q4  5.21  -9.81  41.75  46.99  0.84 
Czech Rep.  1991Q4  5.29  -8.29  25.24  74.5   
Ecuador 2000Q1  14.55  -19.22  117.52  118.2  1.85 
Indonesia 2001Q1  4.78  -7.99  29.62  113.67  6.64 
India 2004Q2 3.08  -4.62  9.07  14.23  3.52 
Israel 
1985Q3 16.63  -20.62  9.6  22.94  1.8 
1989Q3 2.59  -6.01  2.99  24.87  1.48 
1976Q3 6.96  -19.96  -36.54  104.63  -17.42 
South 
Korea 
1988Q1 9.15  -12.82  21.61  28.38  -0.53 
1998Q1 15.72  -12.88  32.36  66.56  -3.25 
2004Q1 4.68  -4.05  23.69  30.15  0.05 
Malaysia 
1987Q4 7.94  -9.95  -11.9  55.65  6.51 
1999Q3 17.68  -10.89  3.99  38.53  3.62 
Mexico 
1983Q4 3.96  -5  -14.36  88.78  -1.61 
1987Q4 3.06  -5.89  38.34  49.59  3.52 
Peru 1979Q4 4.61  -10.83  9  41.68  3.75 
Philippines 1986Q4  3.13  -6.61  1.12  49.3  9.82 
Poland 1990Q4  5.66  -10.36  54.43  1277.67  -3.28 
Russia 
2000Q2 20.25  -12.2  33.47  81.44  4.37 
2005Q2 12.49  -5.91  23.29  51.97  0.92 
Thailand 
1998Q1 14.35  -11.68  9.13  53.23  0.01 
2001Q2 5.56  -2.82  2.15  14  6.07 
S. Africa 
1980Q1 11.9  -10.13  12.82  52.77  0.9 
1987Q3 6.78  -6.7  -3.44  58.17  1.68 
Average
40   0.08  -0.09  19.79  63.88  1.92 
 
                                                 
40The averages exclude Poland in 1990, to avoid distorting the values.   24
Table 5: List of CA Deficit Adjustment Episodes and Main Characteristics for the G-7  










t0 to t3 
Change in 






Canada  1981Q3  -0.05  0.05  7.18 -33.68 2.41 
Canada  1992Q1  -0.04  0.03 -21.28  -26.17 2.72 
Canada  1993Q4  -0.04 0.04 -7.97  -26.18  10.00 
Canada  1997Q3  -0.02 0.05 -6.13  -12.37  11.79 
France  1982Q3  -0.04  0.03  1.76 -16.12 3.47 
France  2008Q3  -0.03  NA NA NA NA 
Germany 2000Q3  -0.02  0.05  7.29  -12.97  -1.42 
Italy  1981Q1  -0.03 0.03 4.69 -7.83 2.56 
Italy  1992Q3  -0.02  0.05 -24.68  -29.35 2.50 
Italy  2008Q3  -0.03  NA NA NA NA 
US  1987Q2  -0.03  0.02  2.27 -32.85 7.34 
US  2006Q3  -0.07  NA NA NA NA 
UK  1974Q2  -0.04  NA NA NA NA 
UK  1975Q3  -0.02 0.03 -5.64  -14.70  2.16 
UK  1989Q3  -0.05  0.04  5.86 -23.63 6.09 
UK  2006Q4  -0.04  NA NA NA NA 
UK  2008Q2  -0.02  NA NA NA NA 
Average    -0.04 0.04 -3.33  -21.44  4.51 
 
 Table 6: List of CA Surplus Adjustment Episodes and Main Characteristics for the G-7  










t0 to t3 
Change in 






Canada 2000Q4  0.03  -0.02  14.66  18.84  10.26 
Canada 2002Q1  0.02  -0.01  24.01  26.03  8.61 
Canada  2004Q1  0.02 -0.01 9.75 35.28 9.34 
Canada  2005Q4  0.03  NA NA NA NA 
France 1997Q2  0.03  -0.02  -8.12  16  6.82 
Germany 1989Q1  0.05  -0.06  -1.63  13.89  2.08 
Germany  2006Q4  0.08  NA NA NA NA 
Italy  1996Q3  0.04 -0.03 5.46 15.16 4.87 
Italy  1998Q2  0.03 -0.03 7.83 12.8 -0.56 
Japan 1988Q3  0.04  -0.02  -6.54  47.63  0.8 
Japan 1990Q4  0.03  0.01  24.71  45.88  -4.16 
Japan 1991Q3  0.02  0.02  29.9  47.92  -5.27 
Japan 1997Q3  0.05  -0.03  13.84  49.75  -1.76 
Japan 1999Q1  0.02  0.01  -12.53  28.35  0.03 
Japan 2000Q3  0.03  0.01  -17.92  28.35  1.06 
Japan  2007Q3  0.05  NA NA NA NA 
UK 1981Q4  0.04  -0.04  -17.26  35.9  0.73 
Average  0.04 -0.02 4.73 30.13 2.35 
    25








Argentina  No cointegration  0.108 16.596 15.495 0.034 
Bolivia  No cointegration  0.050 5.571 15.495 0.746 
Brazil  No cointegration  0.108 18.633 15.495 0.016 
Chile  No cointegration  0.080 16.377 15.495 0.037 
China  No cointegration  0.052 7.888 15.495 0.477 
Colombia  No cointegration  0.165 26.019 15.495 0.001 
Czech Rep.  No cointegration  0.078 10.028 15.495 0.279 
Ecuador  No cointegration  0.141 21.359 15.495 0.006 
Hungary  No cointegration  0.117 15.812 15.495 0.045 
Indonesia  No cointegration  0.095 15.120 15.495 0.057 
India  No cointegration  0.081 13.872 15.495 0.087 
Israel  No cointegration  0.147 25.535 15.495 0.001 
South Korea  No cointegration  0.119 18.859 15.495 0.015 
Malaysia  No cointegration  0.046 7.524 15.495 0.518 
Mexico  No cointegration  0.202 28.142 15.495 0.000 
Peru  No cointegration  0.096 14.032 15.495 0.082 
Philippines  No cointegration  0.059 8.907 15.495 0.374 
Poland  No cointegration  0.148 19.960 15.495 0.010 
Russia  No cointegration  0.238 22.183 15.495 0.004 
Thailand  No cointegration  0.094 14.361 15.495 0.074 
Turkey  No cointegration  0.088 9.850 15.495 0.292 
S. Africa  No cointegration  0.093926 14.42595 15.49471 0.072 
 
Note: Shaded rows indicate that we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 10 per cent level.  26
Table 8: VECM Results (CA/GDP and log(RER), t-stats in [ ]) 
Country    αca  βRER   Country  αca  βRER 
Argentina 
-0.13607***  0.080371***    
Israel 
-0.128*  0.351295*** 
[-2.94695]  [ 4.54541]     [-1.89986]  [ 3.37410] 
Brazil 
-0.08221***  0.061217**     South 
Korea 
-0.2953***  0.188198*** 
[-2.96081]  [ 2.26715]     [-3.80983]  [ 3.46311] 
Chile 
-0.13516***  0.093885**    
Mexico 
-0.03694***  -0.091 
[-2.74500]  [ 2.50483]     [-2.59578]  [-1.32468] 
Colombia 
-0.16395***  0.090283***    
Peru 
-0.1061***  0.010 
[-4.72445]  [ 5.63032]     [-2.96635]  [ 0.25648] 
Ecuador 
-0.23211***  0.00639    
Poland 
-0.141***  0.004 
[-3.90935]  [ 0.16578]     [-3.69769]  [ 0.73432] 
Hungary 
-0.19155***  0.110034***    
Russia  -0.009154 0.908702 
[-3.64089]  [ 4.12421]     [-0.45351] [  3.66746] 
Indonesia 
-0.15597***  0.119155***    
Thailand 
-0.09502**  0.252644*** 
[-3.93306]  [ 6.50290]     [-2.23120]  [ 2.73295] 
India 
-0.20918***  0.00442     South 
Africa 
-0.11733**  -0.056 
[-2.71235]  [ 0.58196]     [-2.41479]  [-1.00602] 
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Bolivia  None *  0.36 65.96 47.86 0.00
China  None *  0.22 58.14 47.86 0.00
Czech Rep.  None *  0.61 69.42 47.86 0.00
Malaysia  None *  0.21 52.39 47.86 0.02
Philippines  None *  0.25 58.08 47.86 0.00








Table 10: Cointegrating Vectors (GDP growth, GDP growth*, CA/GDP, RER, t-stat in [ ])
  
Country    αca  βRER  βGDP  βGDP* 
Bolivia 
0.004615*  -3.47959***  -0.43812***  0.384645*** 
[ 1.66350]  [-6.70420]  [-6.25425]  [ 3.83404] 
China 
-0.00284*  0.031873  0.010044  0.159871*** 
[-1.54592]  [ 0.31487]  [ 0.57973]  [ 4.48314] 
Czech Rep. 
-0.3878***  -0.14227***  0.002373*  -0.03072*** 
[-4.20849]  [-4.34146]  [ 1.59733]  [-6.00841] 
Malaysia 
-0.0553***  0.345256***  0.038091***  -0.00019 
[-3.00999]  [ 4.51579]  [ 6.51268]  [-0.01276] 
Philippines 
-0.05896  0.07472***  -0.00594***  -0.00887** 
[-0.96907]  [ 2.38492]  [-3.86653]  [-1.99659] 
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Chart 1: Volatility of the CA versus Volatility of the RER (Standard Deviation, 1994–2008) 
 
Chart 2: Volatility of the Real and the Nominal Exchange Rates (Standard Deviation, 1994–2008) 
 
   29
Chart 3: Event-Study Results for EMEs: Evolution of the CA, the RER, and GDP Growth during CA Deficit 
and Surplus Reversals 
41  
Current Account Deficit Reversals (43 episodes) 
42  Current Account Surplus Reversals (29 episodes) 
 
 
                                                 
41 We constructed envelopes as well as confidence intervals for the event study. However, both are relatively wide 
and add little information. 
42 Although we found 55 current account deficit reversals in our sample, we use only 43 episodes for which data are 

























































































































































































































































































































Chart 4: Event-Study Results for the G-7: Evolution of the CA, the RER, and GDP Growth during CA 
Deficit and Surplus Reversals 












































































































































































































































































































Chart 5: Total Depreciation
43 versus the Size of the CA Deficit Adjustment 
 




                                                 
43 Total depreciation is defined as the percentage change between the maximum value of the RER in the three years 
leading up to the reversal minus the minimum value of the RER in the three years following the reversal.   32
Chart 7: Event-Study Results: CA Deficit Reversals in EMEs: Crisis versus Non-Crisis Episodes 
















































































































































































































































































































































































Fixed Interim Float Crisis  34
Chart 9: Event-Study Results: CA Deficit Reversals in EMEs: Fixed versus Flexible ER Regimes 






























































































































































































































































































































Chart 10: Event-Study Results: CA Surplus Reversals in EMEs: Fixed versus Floating ER Regimes
44  








                                                 
44 The sample size for this table is very small (4 fixed ER regimes and 10 floating ER regimes); the results should 





















































































































































































































































































































Chart 11: Adjustment Speed of the CA to the Cointegration Relation αca
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